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The main aim of this piece is to explain the reasons why there was no 
continuity in Argentina's economic policy. The political immaturity in the practice 
of democracy in Argentina led to a bipartisan system as the only way to achieve 
institutional stability. Both political lines, however, have in their ideas and 





The main aim of this piece is to explain the reasons why there was no 
continuity in Argentina's economic policy. For the last fifty years, Argentina has 
had a bipartisan system: Peronism vs. Radicalism. Although there have been other 
parties, they were mostly minorities lacking power of representation -Socialism, 
Christian Democracy, Conservatives, and Communism. After the fall of Peron's 
government (1955), the Argentine society was divided between Peronists and 
anti-Peronists. The political proscription of Peronism caused not only political 
instability, but also a crisis in government itself. Instability and crisis 
characterised the administrations of Dr. Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) and Dr. 
Arturo Illia (1963-1966). Both were overthrown by military coups with the 
consent of political parties, which wanted the proscription on Peronism to 
continue. This in turn prompted the formation of urban and rural armed groups 
that helped the social dismemberment, which took the country to endless military 
coups. This situation inflicted deep cultural and political wounds, which continue 
to haunt the country even today. The political immaturity in the practice of 
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democracy led to a bipartisan system as the only way to achieve institutional 
stability. Both political lines, however, have in their ideas and actions certain 
concepts and procedures that are inherent to Argentina's unstable political 
situation. 
 
The crisis of the old system and the application of neo-liberalism in 
Argentina 
 
After the third Peronist government (1973-1976) and through the military 
dictatorship (1976-1982), Peronism suffered a political crisis due to the death of its 
leader, Juan Domingo Peron (1974). Members of the Peronist Youth and some 
sectors of the Left, disappointed with the political model applied by Peron, preferred 
either moderate versions of their ideas or social democracy, for which there was no 
room in Peronist unionism. Within the party's political structure a "Renovation" was 
taking place, which sought to update the national and popular doctrine by taking 
elements from European experiences of Christian Democracy or Social Democratic 
reformism. The leader of this political line within Peronism was Antonio Cafiero.
1 
As these changes were taking place within Peronism, the Union Cívica 
Radical (UCR - Civic Radical Union) was presenting a more homogeneous 
political framework, although here too there were two confronting sectors that 
disagreed about presidential elections. On the one hand, there was Dr. Raul 
Alfonsín, who worked on new political strategies supported by intellectuals and 
part of the Radical youth, mostly belonging to centre-left. On the other hand, 
there was a sector represented by the old and traditional political image of 
Radicalism, which was weakened by Dr. Ricardo Balbín death. 
For the elections of October 1983, Argentina's political outlook was rather 
confusing. Peronism had lost its strength, showing lack of internal organization 
and a worn-out political ideal. At the same time, prominent politicians were 
facing transparency and legitimacy problems in their offices. The legendary 
liberal Alvaro Alsogaray, who was trying to attract a variety of minority groups 
that had never succeeded in elections, drew sectors of the Right wing to create a 
party that would have some power of representation. He formed the UCD (Union 
del Centro Democratico - Democratic Centre Union), supported by professionals 
and intellectuals who, following the international trend, favored the new market 
economy. 
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The Left was supported by the PI (Partido Intransigente Intransigent Party), 
formed by youngsters with a deep revolutionary ideology and led by Oscar 
Alende
1. 
According to the panorama we described, we could say that Radicalism, as 
compared to the other parties, presented a democratic, tolerant, and ethical attitude, 
as opposed to what was offered by its peers. 
The goal of this piece is to show that deep institutional, political, economic, 
and social changes manifested themselves until the return of democracy in 1983. 
But these changes changed their path in 1989, and up to the present time this 
deviation has left us in uncertainty of how they will develop in the future. 
 
The road to democratization 
 
Alfonsín administration was conditioned by three circumstances: a) the 
Armed Forces, b) the violation of Human Rights, and c) the economic situation. 
There can be no doubt that these were three pervading problems throughout his 
time in government. The president adopted a position with the members of the 
military elite that was more rigid than the one the Peronists would have adopted 
if they had won the elections
2. The Peronist party opposed the   government from 
the Cámara de Senadores (Senate), where it represented the majority, by repelling 
laws that needed to be urgently passed. One of the most important episodes was 
the case of the new Unionist Law, which granted unionist minorities some       
acknowledgement, and would bring about the decentralization of the 
administration of Union funds. This in turn prompted the CGT (Confederation 
General del Trabajo - General Labor Confederation) to show its disapproval by 
means of noisy strikes against the government. These strikes were carried out 
supposedly to protest against the economic situation, but they evidently had a 
political tinge. Alfonsin succeeded in keeping his head over water through the 
increasing turmoil. In the Parliamentary elections of 1985, Radicals retained their 
majority in the Camara de Diputados (House of Representatives from each prov-
ince), because the divided Peronists continued to lose the support of the middle 
class. However, in the provincial elections of 1987, the Peronist candidates to 
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Congress won over the Radicals by 41% against 37%, and they extended their 
influence to nearly all the provincial governments. 
Economy turned out to be the hardest problem to solve. Following the 
failure of his first measures, in 1985 Alfonsin summoned a team of technicians 
led by Juan Sourrouille. They elaborated an economic plan called "Plan Austral." 
In the beginning, this Plan was successful, inflation decreased to 1-2% a month, 
and confidence was returning.
1 But this stability did not last long and there was a 
succession of economic plans ("Australito" and "Plan Primavera") which failed in 
decreasing inflation. Finally, in February 1989, the political situation worsened, 
even when the next president - Menem - had already been   chosen and there 
were   only some months left for Alfonsin's administration.
2 The outlook of a 
violent and aggressive Peronism forced some private sectors to start buying 
dollars and keeping products from the markets. This situation, together with the 
problems caused by the economic plan, speculation, and a succession of 
Economy Ministers who were not able to handle the crisis, unleashed 
hyperinflation.
3 Hyperinflation forced the Radical government to resign and give 
way to the recently elected president, Dr. Carlos Saul Menem.
4 
 
Peronism in power: Carlos Saul Menem 
 
As he took office as President, Menem had all the reasons at hand to alter 
his political course dramatically. He consorted with the Right wing to appease the 
political and economic situation by appointing Nestor Rapanelli - a representative 
of Bunge y Born, Argentina's most important grain exporter, as Economy 
Minister and Domingo Cavallo as Foreign Affairs   Minister. He also appointed 
Alvaro Alsogaray as a Government Consultant, thus consolidating a liberal 
position in his administration. This came to upset some sectors of Peronism that 
did not like Menem's attitude. Unions, which were fully Peronist, showed their 
disapproval and this caused a division within the CGT. Thus, the unions' political 
influence weakened against the upward movement of private companies.
5 
In our view, this new economic policy reflected the situation of some 
European parties - similar to Peronism in that they were low-class based. These 
parties were forced by the international economic situation to consort with their 
previous enemies and to launch measures that contained many elements of the 
liberal capitalism from the last years of the last century. The dismemberment of 
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the Soviet welfare state - beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 - 
constituted another reason for Argentina's new political orientation. The lack of 
efficiency in the administration of the State, which had been going on for decades, 
had brought about a favorable predisposition in the middle and higher classes 
towards the privatization of state-run companies, which were causing a great 
fiscal deficit. 
About this, Torcuato Di Telia comments: "As regards this topic, attitudes 
were often contradictory. For instance, in 1986, most people in the urban centers 
thought that the State should control prices (83%) and impose a freeze on rents 
(75%), and that it should provide a job for every person in need as well (83%). 
This was the argument behind believing in the action of the State when that 
represented a personal benefit, without necessarily thinking about the possible 
setbacks or secondary consequences. At the same time, however, there was a 
general belief in the greater efficiency of the private companies against the state-
run ones. In a survey carried out in 1990, 78% of people believed that it was better 
if most of the companies were in private hands, and a 71% believed that it was 
more urgent to increase production than to insist on a proper distribution."
1 
After he had announced the measures he would take, Menem's popularity 
increased. In spite of this, the relation between the two sectors of orthodox 
Peronism deteriorated. Some decided to separate from the Peronist party - the so-
called "Grupo de los ocho" (The eight group), but in elections they were not able 
to fulfill their expectations. 
In January 1990, the Economy Minister, Erman Gonzalez, surprised the 
population by changing the money deposited in banks by bonds with high interest 
rates due in ten years, thus literally confiscating the savings of the middle class in 
what was called "Plan Bonex." 
This and other measures did not stop prices from increasing, so hyper-
inflation continued. Going against the basic principles of classic Peronism, 
Menem and his ministers launched a privatization program, selling state-run 
companies to private investors. In June 1990, he sold ENTEL, the sate-run 
telephone company, to a holding of French, Italian and Spanish investors. In July 
1990, he sold Aerolineas Argentinas (Argentinean Airlines) to Spanish Iberia, 
and he also announced that he intended to privatize electricity, coal, natural gas, 
the railways, and the State's marine fleet too. From that moment on, the neo-
liberal economic policy seemed to have succeeded. In 1991, Domingo Cavallo 
was appointed Economy Minister. He extended the privatization campaign, 
which earned the government several million dollars in 1994. He centered his 
program in the "Ley de Convertibilidad" (Convertibility Law) that reduced 
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public expenditure according to income, forbade the emission of currency and 
finally established a 1 to 1 correspondence between the Argentinean peso and the 
American dollar. The confidence in the currency became the key of economic 
credibility and helped a significant increase in the   arrival of foreign investment. 
Cavallo also elaborated a change in the payment schedule of the foreign debt in 
1992 - "Plan Brady", while the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
supported his deep economic measures. Finally, inflation decreased from a 
4900% a year in 1989 to less than 4% a year in 1994, thus getting to an economic 
development rate of 6% a year. This process was called by the main international 
economic thinkers "The Argentinean economy miracle." 
 
What did the "Plan de Convertibilidad" consist of? 
 
The "Plan de Convertibilidad" (Convertibility Plan) was born out of the 
need of setting rigid rules in a country coming out of continuous crises and a 
long history of inflation. By putting this plan into practice, the inflation rates 
reduced dramatically to the normal levels of developed countries. The tax on 
inflation was eliminated, credit returned - long-term and with low interest rates - 
and there was a general belief that income was continuously increasing, and, 
more importantly, there was a favorable international context as regards interest 
rates for loans. This context brought about a development of demand and of 
internal economic activity, particularly in Latin American countries. The crisis of 
1995 ("Tequila effect" and the crisis in Southeast Asia) evidenced that the 
previous growth had caused an imbalance in the foreign debt that was hardly 
viable in time. This was the consequence of the increase in demand in a context 
where related prices were highly distorted. Some of this policy was only an elec-
toral   maneuver, and some of it aimed at promoting investment, thus increasing 
productivity. 
This distortion of related prices, caused by confidence in the currency, 
reduced the possibility to compete, and here the Argentinean experience differs 
from that of Chile and Southeast Asia. In these two cases, the favorable currency 
gave exports the dynamic element of growth, but this was not the case in 
Argentina. The Argentinean economic model did not increase the possibility of 
competition or the exports. It turned out to be much more harmful in terms of social 
situation and employment, because it excluded a large part of the population. In 
addition, it could not hold with a structure of related prices that had nothing to do 
with its starting point, and that lacked the necessary tools for a renewal in both 
economy and labor.
1 
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This Plan lacked the specific policies that are necessary in the field of 
production and social compensation. It did not have any policy aimed at 
prompting small and medium-size companies to export, or to develop new 
technologies so that they could revitalize their industry. The lack of measures that 
should increase demand of workforce raised certain doubts about the viability of 
growth and caused a regressive distribution of income. To all this, we must add 
the government's failure to create policies to compensate the social harm done by 
the Plan, and the process of change within the State. The consequences were an 
increasing exclusion of large portions of the population and a marked 
polarization of society. 
Another important change during Menem's first administration took place 
in 1994, when the government was granted Congress approval to amend the 
National Constitution. As was agreed between Menem and Alfonsin,
1 by means 
of the amendments, the time in office would be reduced from 6 to 4 years, but re-
election would be allowed; the authority of the president to rule through 
emergency decrees was limited; and there would be created the office of "Jefe de 
Gabinete" (Head of Ministers). The person appointed for this office could be 
removed by the majority vote of Congress.
2 The amendments also strengthened 
the Judicial Power and granted autonomy to the City of Buenos Aires. The 
advocates of this constitutional reform insisted that the amendments could 
improve government responsibility, by decentralizing power and instituting a 
new check and balance system. 
It is interesting to consider under this light the process of amending the 
Constitution. For the political science, this process is a very interesting one, due 
to the dynamics that came into play during its different stages. Following the 
trend of the neo-contractualist positions in current political science, we could say 
that an amendment to the Constitution implies a reformulation of the social 
contract between those who govern and those who are governed. From the 
perspective of liberal democracy, in a process of amendment many things come 
into play, mainly the terms under which society shares its sovereignty in the 
political sphere, the procedures to do this, its rights, and the way government is 
to be conducted. But Constitutions might have a further function above the one 
of establishing what actions are to be allowed and which are not. Constitutions 
should also have the function of creating availability of power, turning a political 
system into a continuous source of active power t o  c a r r y  o u t  s o c i a l  
transformation projects. This can only be done by those who have legitimacy and 
knowledge, so that political participation of citizens can be increased.
3 
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The policy of generating power has been historically determined by a 
system of added benefits. Power, in any society, is an important resource that 
society itself has to generate. We believe that the Argentine society has lost great 
amounts of power from the times of the return to democracy in 1983 to present 
time. There have been many signs that show a growing lack of interest in public 
affairs. Among these, we can mention the general feeling of disappointment 
about politics, the wearing out of the politicians' credibility, the stiffness of the 
participation procedures, and finally, the surveys carried out on the population in 
recent years. In this context, it is necessary to assess the amendments carried out 
in 1994, in relation to the possible solutions to the problems we have described. 
We think it is important to take into account how costly it was to carry out the 
immense political effort necessary to amending the Constitution. It was a very 
high price to pay, we could even say unique in the institutional history of any 
country. Even today, it is difficult to assess what was the actual cost of this 
amendment. A clear example is the division of Radicalist leaders into those who 
were for the agreement and those who were against it. This division was just the 
tip of the iceberg for a party in deep crisis, forced to choose between the 
agreement and a possible defeat in the coming plebiscite. The process of 
amendment can be seen from many different perspectives. One of them is the 
basic expectations that led to it, although it would not be enough to consider this 
as the most important aspect. In this respect we do not think we are mistaken in 
saying that the final outcome of this amendment, born out of an agreement 
between two political parties, was only a manifestation of this agreement and it 
did not show a one and coherent logic. Nevertheless, we believe that this was not 
the main flaw in the amendment. What we can say is that, in this process, many 
problems were solved by means of transactions between two amendment projects 
that had originated in expectations that were not only different, but also in many 
cases even contradictory. The amendment agreement was only that, and not an 
agreement in government. It was bound to finish only in the passing of some 
sections of the law and the withdrawal of a Supreme Court judge. The laws 
necessary to putting into practice the control measures proposed by Radicalism 
were only a bunch of disconnected and complicated rules. As it was, they were 
mostly implemented through some unimportant laws in a Congress where 
Radicalism did not represent a majority. In exchange, they only received the 
possibility of re-election in the hands of a Peronist president.
1 
Leaving aside the peculiarities of the process in Argentina, we have to 
consider certain aspects when evaluating the amendment to the Constitution. The 
main source of problems related to the expectations around this amendment was 
the idea of a lighter Presidencialist system. To deepen our analysis we first need 
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to look at the characteristics attributed to this system.
1 The system, which has 
been widely analyzed by specialized authors in Latin America, tends to favor the 
Executive power over the other powers in government. Abusing this 
characteristic has led presidents in different circumstances and places to obtain 
great power, thus invading the sphere of the other powers. Despite this, the idea 
of a lighter Presidencialist system has some obscure aspects that we deem 
interesting to clarify. The Presidencialist system not only includes the Executive 
Power, it includes other powers in government and the governmental agencies 
controlled by it. Of course, the system has certain limitations. For example, the 
best possibility of the opposing party lies in waiting for the failure of the current 
government, or better, the disintegration of the ruling party. 
Finally, we would like to consider the need to draw attention to the almost 
automatic association between the Presidencialist system and the bipartisan 
system. This association can be put down to the fact that while the winning party 
takes all the power, the options tend to polarize among those having more 
possibilities. 
In our view, the Argentinean political system is in for future conflict, which 
will affect the quality of the democracy that is being built. The reforms on the 
Legislative and Judicial power will have some effect in the middle and long term, 
but they will not be enough to eliminate those problems that brought them to their 
current state. 
The true function of the Head of Ministers is far from clear. There are 
certain similarities between this office and the system of the Republic of Weimar 
- the name given to Germany after World War I. Here two fronts were 
threatening with removing the premier: the president and the Congress. Under 
the circumstances, it was very difficult to follow any government plan. Trying to 
soften the Presidencialist system, lest the governmental crisis should become a 
crisis in the whole system, the plan ended up causing never-ending conflict be-
tween the powers of State. 
To sum up, the most important changes in Menem's policy the 
Convertibility Plan, the privatization plan and the amendments to the Constitution 
- were not as efficient as they should have been in solving the socioeconomic 
problems of the country. 
But there were also negative aspects that can be blamed on Radicalism, for 
instance the fact that the amendment to the Constitution implied Menem's 
continuity in office. This being so, the privatization plan continued, following the 
neo-liberal economic model. Entire towns that had developed thanks to the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources such as oil and gas were devastated. 
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Their inhabitants had worked under the protection of national companies, and 
when these were gone; their situation became critical because there were no jobs 
available for them. The measures proposed regarding education and health 
produced antagonism between the provincial governments and Unions, causing 
outbreaks of violence.
1 
In Argentina, the deep changes of the last years have altered the power of 
action of the basic institutions in society, due to a weakening in the power of the 
State. The State, currently pervaded by a heavy bureaucracy and in need of 
technical support, has difficulties in answering the claims of society.
2 Although 
Congress is still the gravitational centre of the political system, the independent 
institutions represent a possibility created by society itself. These institutions 
represent a link between the political system and the social sphere of the "Tercer 
Sector" (Third Sector), in a new attempt to achieve social development.
3 
 
The capacity to rule and the Third Sector 
 
The capacity to rule is an elusive concept, its definition and even its ex-
istence depending on the confidence each society has in its government and in 
the process that makes it possible. In today's world, and particularly in Argentina 
and Latin America, the issue of the capacity to rule is again under the spotlight. 
Those Latin American countries that could never guarantee the capacity to 
rule, even when they had achieved certain growth, are currently facing a sad 
picture: growth is being threatened by political turmoil. Consequently, the 
capacity to rule in the political arena is now becoming an important element of 
the context under which development is possible.
4 This issue is often seen only 
under the light of the government's ability to manage development, but 
legitimacy and governmental stability depend on more than that. In order to 
understand this concept fully, we need to examine a number of processes. The 
most important of them are those related to the strengthening of society, civic cul-
ture development, economic orientations, and behavior, and the inclusion of 
larger portions of the population in the production system.
5 
The economic policy also determines the capacity to rule. In the first place, 
the characteristics and efficiency of the economic model affect the conditions 
under which the capacity to rule develops. The context in which the 
industrialized countries could be governed in the past was characterized by 
economic growth, social prosperity, and state intervention. Things would have 
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been different in a context of slow economic development, reduction of public 
expenditure, consumption and credit, and State shrinkage. In the second place, 
these conditions and consequently the capacity to rule, depend on the economic 
model in force. In the case of Argentina and other Latin American countries, the 
difference is that these are still developing countries, and they had to learn how 
to handle their political and institutional systems   in   only   two   centuries   of 
autonomy. They inherited the political structure of the colonizing countries that 
were rich in tradition and experience. This immaturity and the lack of 
institutional stability are only some of the differences that Latin America 
presents. To sum up, we could say that, since they gained their independence, 
Latin American countries inherited European civic culture. Nevertheless, in most 
cases, this was only restricted to the ruling   classes, and worse, only during the 
early years.
1 
In the last decades, Latin American economies have tended to adopt an 
economic model based on the change of the production system, technological 
modernization and an opening to foreign markets, followed by an increased ability 
to compete internationally. Latin American societies have accepted that it is 
necessary to follow this model. Regrettably, a rigid implementation, lack of power 
of decision or efficiency would impair the capacity to rule in these countries. We 
could say then that the capacity to rule depends on the concurrence of many 
elements, such as the ability to maintain the system stable. The assurance that the 
strategy can be continued in time is also vital, even when this means protecting it 
from the unfair austerities imposed by the internal and international oligarchy over 
the majority, or from dangerous popular reactions.
2 
The capacity to rule  does not originate in or depend on the efficiency, 
honesty and transparency of the State, but on a national agreement on the one 
hand, and stability, growth and moral  integration on the other hand. Among the 
possible measures to adopt we find: the decentralization of State action, 
privatization of state-run companies, outsourcing of certain services, deregulation 
of certain areas in economy, strengthening of private companies   and     
modernizing  workforce-management   relations   within them, and finally 
assuming public responsibilities.  Some of these measures are already being 
taken in Latin America and Argentina. The reform of the State is being carried 
out according to a number of parameters.
3 These are: the strengthening of civil 
society, a tendency towards political pluralism, the consolidation of a dynamic 
market economy, and social integration based on the inclusion of the largest 
possible number of citizens in the production process. 
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In Argentina, the latest changes have altered the potential functions of basic 
social institutions. Mass-media, private interests groups, and social demonstration 
practices are replacing the political parties that used to represent the link between 
government and population. One of the greatest divides is the one that separates 
the political system from society. It is clearly necessary to reinforce the bond 
between the political representatives and the social and economic institutions. The 
State, pervaded by a heavy bureaucracy and in need of technical support, has 
problems in answering the claims of society.
1 Although Parliament is still the 
gravitational centre of the political system, a new opening for intermediary 
institutions can be seen at the very core of society. 
There is clear evidence that a new participation culture is rising. There is 
wide agreement today regarding the relevance of the political and social 
institutions stability as the only way to reach a stable and strong democracy. Here 
we can see the importance of the political parties, of the institutions of society 
and of the Third Sector. Society's capacity to act has been almost completely 
destroyed in Argentina. Figures show that governmental support for education, 
health, and security is decreasing. In addition, there are high levels of un-
employment and sub-employment. And even those who do have a job in many 
cases do not earn enough to full-fill their basic needs.
2 
This is a country where people, due to the lack of resources they suffer in 
young age, do not have the slightest possibility of reaching the educational 
standards necessary for competing on the job market. This is caused not only by 
lack of money, but also, in many cases, by malnutrition. The solution is not giving 
schools some computers, but fighting malnutrition. If this is not done, people will 
not be able to fit in a society that is increasingly competitive and sophisticated.
3 
It is important to highlight, however, that malnutrition is not only an 
Argentinean problem. It is a worldwide problem, and is even more serious in 
Latin America. The golden age of neo-liberalism as the economic policy of the 
Latin American governments led to this situation. Different political parties do 
not have great differences as regards this issue, and although they may seem to 
have opposite orientations, most of them have adopted neo-liberalism as 
principle. An exception to this, however, is the Argentinean president, Nestor 
Kirchner, who was elected in 2003. Liberalism is supposed to be a doctrine that 
encourages economic growth, while taking technical progress from the high to 
the lower classes. After having tried it for some time, we can say that these ideas 
are mistaken, and we have the argument of reality to support our opinion. Neo-
liberal policies cannot be applied anymore, they are twenty years old and are 
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showing signs of decline. This is not a mere debate about theories: facts 
themselves are claiming for a change. For example, according to neo-liberal 
ideas, it is important and necessary to promote a free market economy. Doing 
this, competence is encouraged and this in turn makes prices go down, thus 
improving the standard of living. This idea has not worked at all in Argentina for 
the last ten years. 
From now on, we need to pay close attention to what is happening in 
Argentina. After 1990, Argentinean society has been trying to go back to the idea 
of a welfare state. This policy, that has shown many correctable flaws, has also 
shown that it can challenge the theories and practices of neo-liberal economic 
policy. 
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